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Introduction 
Can fiscal policy be used to stabilize the economy? In  this essay we 
first develop  an equilibrium  theory  of  fluctuations  consistent  with  the 
observed persistence  of  unemployment  and  then  address this  question 
within  the  framework  3f  that  theory.  We  conclude that  fiscal policy 
rules,  which  alter relative prices facing firms and households,  can and 
have had important effects upon the stability of  the economy. Some rules 
increase fluctuations and others smooth out the business cycle. In choos- 
ing  among rules the criterion  used is the cost-benefit measure of  neo- 
classical public finance, which has been  applied to numerous problems 
involving important effects of  government policies upon resource alloca- 
ti0n.l  Our conclusion is that tax rates should remain constant or nearly 
constant over the cycle with the budget being balanced on average. This 
does not minimize fluctuations but does minimize the deadweight burden 
of  financing government expenditures. 
Need for Rules 
At this point we emphasize that the choice is from a set of  fiscal policy 
rules. Only  if  businesses and  households  have a basis for forming ex- 
pectations of  future policies do they have well-defined decision problems, 
a prerequisite for the application of  modern public finance theory. Only 
We would  like  to thank  the discussants,  the editor,  V.  V.  Chari, and Walter 
Dolde  for comments.  Research  was  partially  supported  by  the  National Science 
Foundation. 
1.  See for example Feldstein  1974 for his  analysis of  the effects of  the Social 
Security System upon capital accumulation. 
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then is the behavior of  the economic agents econometrically predictable. 
This is just the point made by Lucas  (1976) in his critique of  current 
econometric  policy  evaluation  and  will  not  be dwelt  upon  here.  We 
emphasize that the fixed-rule procedure we advocate does not necessarily 
imply constant values or constant growth rates of  the policy instruments. 
Feedback rules with the tax parameters varying systematically with eco- 
nomic conditions are considered. A policy rule, however, is needed be- 
fore one can predict what equilibrium process will govern the economy. 
The policy problem considered is that of  choosing from a set of  fiscal 
policy  rules  for  setting  tax rates  and  levels  of  government  spending. 
Rather than characterizing the rule that is best in the cost-benefit sense 
of  modern public finance, principles  are sought for the design of  policy 
rules  that  do well  in  terms  of  this  criterion.  This  is  done  for  three 
reasons. First, the policy that is best, relative to the specified objective, 
may be very complicated and not explainable to the public. This negates 
its  usefulness,  for  the  democratic  policy  selection  process  is  not  well 
suited to making subtle second-  and third-best  distinctions. Second, the 
determination of  optimal policy requires precise estimation of  the param- 
eters of  preferences and technology,  and these estimates  are not  avail- 
able and probably not obtainable. Third, the optimal policy will almost 
surely be time inconsistent, as we have previously shown (Kydland and 
Prescott  1977). Even for deterministic dynamic optimal taxation prob- 
lems, if  one again solves the optimization problem subsequent to the ini- 
tial period, taking as given decisions already made, the resulting optimal 
plan for the remainder of  the planning horizon is inconsistent  with the 
initially optimal plan. Besides invalidating the principle of  selecting the 
action  which  is  best  given the current situation,  a principle  needed  to 
justify discretionary policy, the computation of  the optimal taxation pro- 
gramming  problem  when  there  is  uncertainty  is  beyond  our  current 
capabilities. This time inconsistency does not arise because of  a conflict 
between social and private objectives except insofar as people value con- 
sumption of  public  goods and prefer  not to pay taxes. The problem is 
present  even if  the social objective is the welfare of  the representative 
individual.2 
2.  Calvo  (1977),  in a very interesting paper, has demonstrated the time incon- 
sistency of an optimal monetary policy.  Since inflation  can be viewed  as a  tax on 
liquidity, his is an optimal taxation analysis.  The authors (1978~)  have explored 
further the problems of  computing optimal policy.  Bellman’s principle of  optimal- 
ity was shown to hold if  policy  is constrained  to rationalize past decisions of  pri- 
vate  agents.  In that  paper the  standard  optimal  taxation  problem  is  extended  to 
dynamic environments. 171  A Competitive Theory of  Fluctuations 
Need for a Theory Consistent with Facts 
A prerequisite for the application of  neoclassical public finance is an 
equilibrium theory, that is, a specification of  preferences and technology 
which  rationalizes  choices  of  the economic  actors.  The puzzle  of  the 
business cycle is why output does not vary smoothly over time but rather 
fluctuates about trend. In the postwar period some of  these deviations of 
measured  output from  trend  have  exceeded  5% of  trend  output. The 
rate of  capital  accumulation,  in  particular  the production  of  producer 
and consumer durables, is  highly correlated  with  output  (all variables 
are measured  as percentage  deviation from  trend) ; however,  the per- 
centage fluctuations are of  much greater amplitude. Fluctuations in labor 
supplied are also positively and strongly correlated with output and have 
amplitudes comparable with those of  real output. An equilibrium theory 
must  explain  these  well-known  facts  about the  comovements  of  these 
aggregate economic time series. 
A second set of  observations that confronts a theory of  business fluctu- 
ations  is  the  persistence  of  deviations  of  output  from  trend.  Indeed, 
these  persistent  deviations  have  been  taken  by  many  as  an  argument 
against the use of  equilibrium models with rational expectations to ex- 
plain  business cycle phenomena. Modigliani  (1977, p. 6), in his presi- 
dential  address,  states:  “But  the most  glaring flaw of  MREH (Macro 
rational expectations hypothesis)  is its inconsistency with the evidence: 
if it were valid, deviations of  unemployment from the natural rate would 
be small and transitory-in  which case The General Theory would not 
have been written and neither would this paper.” 
An  indication  of  this  persistence  can be  obtained by  regressing the 
detrended  log  of  real  output  on itself  lagged  one period  and  on  the 
lagged rate of  change.  The estimated equation from quarterly  data for 
the 1947-77  period is 
(.026)  (.082) 
S.E. =  .00011  R2 =  .908 
This second-order difference equation is stable with largest eigen-value 
.75. Given this fact  and that there  are  120 observations, large sample 
theory should provide nearly valid inference. 
For this difference equation  the  expected  deviation  from  trend  this 
period is a function not only of  last period’s deviation but also of  the rate 
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momentum, results in the response to an innovation not being greatest in 
the initial period but rather increasing to a peak in a period subsequent 
to the innovation before subsiding (see fig. 5.1 ) . 
Additional evidence for persistence and momentum is the research of 
Barro (1977, 1978). He finds that the effects of  unanticipated monetary 
shocks upon output initially increased before dampening. Sims’s (  1979) 
estimates  of  response  functions  of  real  output  to  innovations  in  the 
vector autoregressive process display a similar pattern. 
The Monetary Shock Theory 
Lucas  (1972) developed  an equilibrium business  cycle theory  with 
monetary  shocks to explain the negative  correlation of  output  and the 
consumption  of  leisure  or  non-market-produced  goods  and  services. 
Monetary  shocks  confound  relative  price  shifts resulting  in  correlated 
supply errors in a decentralized economy. Crucial to this theory is the 
intertemporal  substitutability  of  leisure,  which  implies  that temporary 
changes in expected real wages have important effects upon labor supply 
even though permanent  changes have little or even slightly negative ef- 
fects. We find the theory that monetary shocks have important effects on 
real  aggregates  appealing  and  the  evidence  supportive. But we  think 
shocks to technology and fiscal policy shocks, which affect relative prices, 
are  also  important  in  triggering  economic fluctuations.  The following 
analysis  of  the  deterministic  equilibrium  growth  model  suggests  that 
variations in factors affecting the equilibrium rate of  capital accumula- 
tion could give rise to fluctuations  in  investment  of  the magnitude ob- 
served in the postwar  period. We emphasize that this analysis is not  a 
substitute for  a  rational  expectations theory with  shocks, which is de- 
time period 
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veloped  subsequently.  Rather,  it  is  a  simple  exercise to bring to bear 
prior knowledge about preferences and technology to determine whether 
such factors should be ruled out as a quantitatively important source of 
fluctuations. 
Quantitative Importance of  Real and Policy Shocks 
Policies that affect the relative price of  capital goods, leisure, and con- 
sumption have important effects upon the stationary capital stock. Ab- 
stracting from growth, as our concern is with deviations from trend, the 
stationary capital stock k* satisfies 
(1 -  8) fk(ks,ns) =  q(6 +  PI, 
where 8 is  the corporate tax rate,  fk the marginal  product  of  capital, 
nS  the stationary labor supply, q the effective price of  new capital, 6 the 
exponential depreciation rate of  capital, and p  the subjective time dis- 
count rate. 
The effective price of  capital is related to fiscal policy parameters and 
the inflation rate as follows: 
q=l-T-  e+ 
++T+P’ 
where  r is  the  investment  tax  credit  rate,  + the  capital  consumption 
allowance rate allowed for tax purposes, and T the inflation rate. 
This is the standard rental price analysis of  Jorgenson except for the 
last term, which is the present value of  reductions in future tax liabilities 
and is obtained  by  summing the present  value  of  capital  consumption 
allowances t periods hence, 
from t equal zero to infinity and multiplying by the corporate tax rate 8. 
For purposes of  obtaining order of  magnitude  estimates of  effects of 
policy  parameters  upon  stationary  capital  stock, we  assume  a  Cobb- 
Douglas  production  function  with  capital’s exponent being  .25. If  the 
time period is a year, the initially assumed values for the other param- 
eters  are  p =  .05,  I/J  =  .lo, 6 =  .lo, T =  0,  and  T =  0.  We  also  as- 
sume that changes in the policy parameters have a negligible effect upon 
the stationary labor supply.  This is not an unreasonable  approximation 
given  the small change in per  person labor supply  that has  occurred 
over the last forty years, a period in which there was  a large increase 
in the real wage. 
With these assumptions the effect of  a 10% investment tax credit is 
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ment tax credit was introduced in the early sixties and the depreciation 
schedule accelerated  (9  increased), the rapid rate of  capital accumula- 
tion over much of that decade is no surprise. More surprising, at least to 
us, is the large effect that changes in the anticipated future inflation rates 
have upon the capital stock. A change in the average inflation rate from 
zero to 7% more than offsets the effect of  a 10% investment tax credit, 
at least for the assumed parameter values.  The increase in the average 
inflation rate that occurred in the seventies may be the principal cause 
of  the low rates of  capital accumulation in recent years. 
This structure considers  only  plant  and equipment  in  the  corporate 
sector. This stock is only a fraction of  the physical capital stock and is 
approximately three-quarters of  annual GNP for the American economy. 
Other components of  the capital stock comparable in size are inventories, 
housing stock, stock of  consumer durables, and the public capital stock. 
Considering all  of  these  components,  the  reproducible  capital-annual 
output ratio is about 3 for the American e~onomy.~  A shock to technol- 
ogy, such as the increase in the price of  imported oil that occurred in 
the  early  seventies,  might  reduce  our  production  possibilities  set  by 
2.5%  and therefore stationary capital stock by 10% of  annual GNP.4 
This  stationary  point  analysis  indicates  that  policy  and  technology 
shocks have  effects upon  the stationary  capital  stocks of  the  order of 
10% of  annual GNP. Depending upon the rate of  adjustment along the 
equilibrium path, these  shocks might  or might  not  have  effects com- 
parable in magnitude to observed fluctuations.  To address this issue of 
speed  of  adjustment,  additional  assumptions  about  preferences  are 
necessary.  We  assume  that  the  utility  function  of  the  representative 
household  can be approximated  in  the neighborhood  of  the  stationary 
point by 
(1+~>-*{(1nc~+21n(1  -nt>>. 
t=o 
We also assume that the production relationships are 
f (  kt,  nt) =  kt1/4nt3/4 
and 
~t +  kt+i 5 f(kt,  nt) +  (1 -  s>kt. 
The rest point values for this growth model are ks =  .6132, ns  =  .3103, 
cs =  .3066, and stationary GNP =  .3679. 
3.  These numbers were taken from The Statistical Abstract of  the  United States 
(1976), table  695, p.  428. 
4. We  are assuming  stationary  capital-output  ratio  of  three,  a  Cobb-Douglas 
production  function with coefficient of  capital equal  %, and  a 2.5%  reduction  in 
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We substitute f(kt,nt) +  (1 -  S)kt -  kt+l for ct in the utility func- 
tion and make the quadratic approximation about the stationary values. 
We find that for this approximate problem the equilibrium law govern- 
ing the capital stock is 
kt+l -  k" =  .7544(kt -  k'). 
This solution to the approximate problem is the first-order Taylor series 
approximation at kS  to the equilibrium rule for the growth problem being 
considered. 
The stationary capital-annual  output ratio for the growth problem is 
1.7, and the rate of  adjustment of  capital to the stationary value is almost 
25% per  year. That is, in three years more than half  the gap between 
current and stationary capital stock is closed along an equilibrium growth 
path. If  capital is 10% below its stationary value, labor supply is about 
2.1 % above its stationary value, output 1  % below its stationary value, 
gross investment  2.4%  of  stationary output above its value,  and  con- 
sumption 4.1% below its value. These numbers are not consistent with 
the observed correlations:  other features must be introduced before we 
have  an  explanation  of  fluctuations.  These  numbers  do  indicate  that 
capital-theoretic elements cannot be ruled out as a quantitatively impor- 
tant source of  economic fluctuations. 
A Theory of  Economic Fluctuations 
Ours is a competitive theory which combines the Lucas (1972) mone- 
tary shock model with the model of  capital accumulation in an environ- 
ment with shocks to te~hnology.~  We choose the infinitely lived family 
rather than the overlapping generation abstraction because it facilitates 
bringing to bear prior  knowledge and is easier to analyze. Such struc- 
tures with a single capital good do give rise to the observed comovements 
of  economic  aggregates  and  persistence  of  deviations  of  output  from 
trend  when  plausible  parameters  are assumed.  For the  examples  con- 
sidered, however, momentum for the equilibrium process governing real 
output was not  obtained. Possibly  introducing information  diffusion, a 
feature of  Lucas's  (1975) extension of  his business cycle theory, is the 
way to obtain momentum. We think a more plausible explanation is that 
more than a single period is required to build  a new capital good. The 
work by Jorgenson  (1963, 1971) and recent estimates by Hall (1977) 
suggest that there are long lags from the time when changes in its determi- 
nants call for an increase in  the  capital stock until the time when the 
new capital starts yielding services. 
5.  See Brock  1978 for the theory laid out in detail or Prescott and Mehra 1978, 
where recursive  methods  are used. Black  (1978) has argued that real factors can 
explain aggregate fluctuations. 176  Finn Kydland and Edward C. Prescott 
Supposing that the process of  designing, ordering, and installing capi- 
tal can be described by a fixed distribution of  lags, Hall  (1977) found 
the average  lag to be about two years.  Evidence of  a different kind is 
reported by Mayer  (1960). On the basis of  a survey he found that the 
average lag (weighted by the size of  the project)  between the decision 
to undertake an investment project and the completion of  it was twenty- 
one months.  To this  must  be  added  any lag that occurs  between  the 
arrival of  information and the decision to carry out the investment.  If 
anything,  this  estimate is  likely  to be an underestimate  of  the  actual 
lag during a period of  general expansion. If  most firms decide to expand 
almost simultaneously, delivery lags are likely to be substantially longer 
than would be the case if  investments were evenly spread out over time. 
It should also be noted that lags are generally longer for larger projects. 
Once a project is begun, the cost will be distributed over the period of 
time it takes for it to become productive. According to Mayer, the con- 
struction period for a typical plant is fifteen months. During the time pe- 
riod of  half  a year or so before  start of  construction, plans are drawn, 
financing is arranged, and the first significant orders are placed before con- 
struction  can  begin.  There was,  of  course,  a lot of  variation  in  lead 
times. For example, in his sample of  completed  plants, 20%  required 
ten months or more from start of  drawing of  plans to start of  construc- 
tion.  These findings, which  are probably  low  estimates  for  periods of 
generally high capital accumulation, suggest that only a small fraction of 
additions to capital stock that are decided on in a given year show up as 
investment expenditures in the same year. Most of  the expenditures will 
be incurred during the next year, with a not insignificant fraction being 
left over for the subsequent year. 
To our knowledge, the first analysis incorporating this feature within 
a dynamic equilibrium framework was done by the authors (1977). The 
typical firm in  a competitive industry was assumed to make investment 
plans in period t on the basis of  the state of  the economy at that time, 
the investment tax credit, and expectations about future prices. Part of 
the expenditures were incurred in the same period and the rest in period 
t +  1. The new  capital  stock  was  assumed  to become  productive  in 
period t +  2. Expectations were rational in the sense that, when aggre- 
gated across firms, the investment  behavior did indeed lead to the dis- 
tribution  of  future prices on which individual decisions were based.  In 
that model the propagation of  random demand shocks or changes in the 
tax rate was fairly slow, 
In this paper we present an abstraction in which durables play the role 
of  capital,  although  they were  assumed, directly or indirectly,  to enter 
the consumer’s utility function. Thus, durables as a proportion of  total 
output  are thought of as being roughly  equivalent in magnitude to the 
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to the stock of  durables planned in period t -  L do not produce services 
before period t + 1,  as expressed by the equation 
(1) 
where di,  is the stock of  durables held by individual  i at the beginning 
of  period  t, si1,,  is the plan made in period  t -  L for an addition to the 
stock of  durables, and 0 < ad < 1  is a depreciation rate.  The expendi- 
tures, however, are distributed with a fraction +o  in the planning period 
t -  L, a fraction +1 in period  t -  L +  1, and so on. Total investment 
expenditures in period t are then 
di,t+i = (  1 -  ad) 4, +  SiLt, 
L 
j=O 
where  8  +j =  1.  On the basis of  empirical evidence, it seems reason- 
able that L would be at least two years, that +o  would be relatively small, 
and that 
Lucas  and  Rapping  (1969)  and  Ghez  and  Becker  (1975) found 
ample evidence that leisure time in  one period  is a good substitute for 
leisure time in another  period. This suggests that intertemporal substi- 
tution  is  an  important  feature  of  people’s  preferences.  Greater  inter- 
temporal substitutability can be modeled by introducing a quasi-capital 
element in the utility function which measures how much workers have 
worked in the past, with relatively more weight on the more recent past, 
say given by 
(3) 
where nt is hours worked in period t, and 6,  is a depreciation rate. Both 
a, and Itt enter the current-period utility function. The higher the value of 
at in a given period, the more utility is derived from leisure in that period. 
This model is consistent with the observation that labor supply is elastic 
with respect to transitory changes in the real wage rate, but inelastic with 
respect to permanent changes. 
In this economy we have a large number of  people who have identical 
preferences. Each maximizes expected discounted utility 
would be at least 0.5. 
ai,t+1 =  (1 -  a5)ait +  nit, 
4  pt  u(cit,dit,n*t,ait),  0  < p < 1, 
where cit is consumption  of  nondurables. This is not  a time-separable 
utility function because  is a function of previously supplied labor. But 
it  is determined  recursively,  a property which is needed  to insure that 
resulting equilibrium decision rules are stationary. 
We assume that the function u is such that after using the budget con- 
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quadratic function over the range of  fluctuations. Resulting equilibrium 
decision  rules  are then  linear, as required  for most  econometric time 
series analyses, and the equilibrium is computable. 
For the examples presented here we do not permit loans among indi- 
viduals. The consumer has a store of  value, namely capital, so our some- 
what arbitrary exclusion of  this market should not significantly affect our 
conclusions. Some preliminary results (see Kydland and Prescott 19783) 
support this conjecture and we would be very surprised if  the inclusion of 
a consumer bond market would alter any conclusions. With these apolo- 
getic  statements  the  consumer  is  faced  with  the  sequence  of  budget 
constraints : 
(4  1 
indexed by  t  where  hlt is  his real wage.  Another  set of  constraints he 
faces is: 
C,t =  &inat -  Z,t 
(5)  Siz,t+l =  S,,k-l,t  for k =  1, . . . ,  L. 
The number of  new projects initiated k periods prior to next period will 
be the number  of  projects  initiated  k -  1  periods  prior  to the current 
period. 
We do not assume a standard production function with capital, labor 
and a technology shock parameter because of  the computation problems 
that would result.  Rather we  assume that the sum of  consumption and 
gross investment is constrained by the sum of  individuals’ outputs, hltnzt. 
The curvature of  our  (indirect)  utility function, we think, captures the 
substitutability of  capital for labor in the production process. 
The  exogenous  stochastic  elements  giving  rise  to  fluctuations  are 
shocks  to  productivity.  We  assume  the  individual  A’S  are  distributed 
about an economy wide mean A,, which is  subject to change over time. 
More explicitly, we  assume  At is  subject to a first-order  autoregressive 
process: 
‘It+ I =  pAt +  p +ct+, 
hat =  ht +  Ett for all i. 
The Ezt are distributed independently over individuals and for simplicity 
over time as well. By the law of  large numbers, the average  E,~  over the 
continuum of  individuals is zero with probability  1. In addition, the dis- 
turbances  c  and  E  are  normally  distributed  with  means  of  zero  and 
variances  26  and v~~. 
In order to simplify subsequent analysis we represent the relationships 
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where 
The het  is the expected real wage at time t conditional upon observations 
with index less than t. 
Using the convention of  letting capital letters denote the aggregate or 
per capita quantities of  the corresponding individual variables,  we can 
write 
Some might question whether the real wage does move procyclically 
as the theory requires if  there is to be persistence and momentum. First, 
if  the elasticity of  labor supply with respect to cyclical variations in the 
real wage is high, only small fluctuations in the real wage, say a percent 
or two, are needed to explain the observed fluctuations in employment. 
Measurement  errors  could  very  well  introduce  a  cyclical  bias  in  the 
measurement  of  the  real  wage  of  this magnitude.  In boom  periods  a 
given worker may be assigned to a job which is higher on the internal 
job ladder and has higher pay, and being less experienced, he will cost 
the firm more per  unit  of  effective labor  service in  the boom period.6 
Another potential source of  cyclical measurement bias is that, with the 
implicit employment contract, payments are not perfectly associated over 
time with labor services supplied. Thus, we do not consider it damaging 
to our theory that there is little evidence of  procyclical movement of  the 
real wage. 
The theory presented assumes a single capital good. Generalization to 
multiple capital goods with different time periods required for construc- 
tion  (i.e.,  different  L's)  and  different  distributed  resource  allocations 
(i.e., different sets of  9;s)  is straightforward. Such generalizations were 
not attempted because, besides significantly increasing the costs of  com- 
puting  the  fixed-point  problem  that must  be  solved  to  determine  the 
competitive equilibrium, they were not needed to explain persistence of 
shocks nor did we see any reason why policy conclusions would be at all 
sensitive to the simplification. 
In our model so far we have measured the wage rate in terms of  the 
price of  output (durables or nondurables) .  An important extension is to 
allow for monetary shocks. The individual observes only his own nominal 
wage rate (or the wage rate on his "island")  before making the decision 
6. See  Reder  1962 for a further discussion. 180  Finn Kydland and Edward C. Prescott 
on how much to work in period t.  From the observed nominal wage rate, 
say wit,  and knowledge of  variances  of  shocks, he can infer only with 
error his own real wage rate, hit, and the economywide real wage, At. 
To be specific, assume that 
(10) 
where qt is due to monetary shocks and is assumed to be normally dis- 
tributed with mean zero and variance s2?.  The worker will want to supply 
more labor when his real wage is high relative to what he can expect to 
earn in the future, of  which the economywide real wage rate is an indi- 
cation. He will therefore try to infer hit and At from the observation of 
wit. Given the assumptions above, the conditional expectations are 
Wit =  xit +  ?It, 
E(At I Wit) =  (1 -  $1)  Aet +  $lWit, 
where +bl =  a2[/ (a25 +  u~~  +u~~),  and 
E(xit I Wit) =  (1 -  $2)  Aet +  $2Wit, 
where $* =  (  a2.g +  o~~)  / (  0~6  +  a2E  +  v~~).  It  is  instructive  to  write 
these conditional expectations in a different form: 
(11) 
(12) 
E(At I wit) =  net +  $i(~it 
E(Ait I wit) =  Xit -  (1 -  $2)  ([t 
r)t +  St) 
€it) +  $27t. 
Of  course, some of  the variables on the right-hand  sides of  the last two 
equations are not observable. 
In this setup, if the agent observes a change in wit,  he does not know 
how much of it is due to the monetary shock (st),  to the economywide 
productivity  shock (tt),  or to the difference between  his own  and  the 
average productivity  His knowledge of  relative variances for the 
three shocks, however, allows him to form conditional expectations. Hav- 
ing decided how much labor to supply, he subsequently observes his real 
income. If  it is, say, higher than anticipated, optimal behavior is to allo- 
cate a larger proportion of his income to durables, yielding services in 
future periods, than he would have otherwise. 
Definition of  Equilibrium 
An individual at a point in time is characterized by his state variable 
vector  yt 3  (dt, at, sit, . . . ,  sLt) and wage wt.  The subscripts  i are 
omitted because individuals with the same (yt,wt)  -pair are indistinguish- 
able and consequently choose the same decision vector,  (ct,  sot, nt),  in 
that period. The vector yt was selected to summarize all relevant aspects 
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The state of  the economy is the distribution of  the yt over the im- 
plicitly  assumed  continuum  of  individuals  plus  het.  For our  structure 
only  the  first  moment  of  this  distribution  matters  in  the  sense  that 
equilibrium values of  aggregate economic variables and prices are a func- 
tion of  the population averages only. The convention of  using the corre- 
sponding  capital  letter  to  denote  a  variable’s  population  average  is 
adopted in the subsequent discussion. The economywide state is the pair 
(  Y,Ae).  A second important feature of  our structure-that  it is recursive 
-results  in time invariant, or stationary, equilibrium laws of  motion for 
the economy, as is required for the application of  standard econometric 
time  series analysis.  Equilibrium  prices  and  aggregate variables  are a 
function of  the economy state variable while optimal individual decisions 
are functions of  both individual and economy state variables. Equilibrium 
requires that the individual decision rules imply the aggregate relation- 
ships, that  expectations  are rational,  and that  markets  clear.  We now 
make this more explicit. 
Let  value  function  v(y,w,Y,Ae)  be  the  (equilibrium)  expected  dis- 
counted  utility  for an individual  with  initial  state  (y,w) if  the initial 
economy state is  (Y,Ae).  Primes denote the value  of  a variable in the 
subsequent period. By Bellman’s principle of  optimality, this value func- 
tion must satisfy the following functional equation: 
v(y,w,Y,Ae)  =  max E {max [u(c,d,u,n) 
rn  c.so 
+  p E V(Y’,W’,Y’,Ae’)l  I W,Ae} 
subject to constraints (1)-(5).  In the above, the first expectation is con- 
ditional on his observed nominal wage w.  The maximization with respect 
to n is outside the expectation because the labor supply decision is on the 
basis of  the nominal  wage prior to deducing the value of  the nominal 
shock.  At the  time  of  the  consumption-savings  decision, realized  real 
wage, nominal shock, and therefore  economywide average real wage as 
well are known. 
The one variable whose distribution is not yet well defined is Y’. A 
(linear) law of  motion Y’ =  F (  Y,he,t,r]),  where  and r] are the econ- 
omywide real and nominal shocks, is assumed. Given function F, the de- 
cision problem of  the household is well defined, and there are resulting 
(linear)  optimal decision rules for individuals : 
n =  ne(y,w,y,Ae) 
c =  c(Y,n,Y,Ae,E,r],t). 
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Equations (6) and (10 )are used to obtain labor supply as a function of 
individual and economywide states and the three shocks or 
n =  n(Y,y,Ap,vl,f). 
Averaging variables  (note that  average  E is 0 because  E is independent 
across  individuals),  one  obtains  (N,C,S,)  as  a  linear  function  of 
(Y,Ae,q,f),  which  along with  (8) and  (9) can  be used  to obtain  Y' 
as a function of  (  Y,Ac,q,f).  For equilibrium, this implied law of  motion 
must equal the assumed law of  motion F. 
Our method of  determining an equilibrium is to use backward induc- 
tion  to solve for  the first-period  equilibrium  decision rules  and law of 
motion for finite-period problems. As  the horizon increased, in all cases, 
these equilibrium first-period decision rules converged. This limiting rule 
is  a  solution  to the  infinite-horizon  equilibrium  problem  and  is  com- 
putable. 
Except  for  the  monetary  shocks,  our  abstraction  is  very  much  a 
Robinson Crusoe economy. This we  consider a virtue, for, other things 
being  equal,  we  prefer  a  simple  easily  understood  explanation  to  a 
complicated one. For public finance applications, the introduction of a 
government  debt state variable  and a market  for government  bonds is 
necessary.  This  extension  is  conceptually  straightforward  but  within 
our computability requirement a nontrivial extension. This is the subject 
of  current rescarch,  and we  are optimistic  that the technical  problems 
can be solved. 
Some Results 
The theory  is not  complete until  the parameters  of  preferences  and 
technology and the variances of  the shocks are specified. One approach 
would  be  to estimate the  parameters  using,  say, maximum  likelihood 
techniques.  But  since  this  is  impractical  given  current  computational 
methods and existing computers,  an alternative approach was  adopted. 
We simply specified what we think are reasonable values for the param- 
eters and then varied  some of  the parameters to see if  the results were 
sensitive to the specified value. 
The parameters of  technology, that is the coefficients of  the distribu- 
tion of  investment  expenditures,  are +,,  =  +1 =  0.3 and  +2 =  0.4.  We 
think the evidence previously cited provided  strong prior support for a 
pattern  not too unlike  this  one, and we do not think results  should be 
very sensitive to  the values  assumed for  the  oi,  provided  a significant 
fraction of  the expenditures occurred in each of  the periods. We did find 
that momentum  was  not  obtained  when  investment  projects  initiated 
during this period  became  part of  the productive capital  stock during 
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parameters, but, given the sizable cost of  each example, resources were 
best  allocated  to  varying  the  shock  variances,  about which  our prior 
knowledge is weak. The parameters of  the preference were  selected so 
that stationary values of  the variables would be consistent with the data 
and “long-run” labor supply inelastic. We did some sensitivity analysis 
with respect to these parameters and found the results varied little.’ 
Our first example assumes no monetary shocks (2%  =  0) and highly 
persistent real shocks (  =  .9999). 
Figure 5.2 shows that the effect of  a shock on labor supply and pro- 
duction of  durables peaks two periods subsequent to the shock and then 
approaches a limit with some fluctuation. In the case of  employment, the 
new limit is essentially zero. We have taken  after-shock productivity to 
be  one,  so that  aggregate  output  and  employment are comparable  in 
magnitude. We see that, although purchases of  durables represent roughly 
one-third of  total output, their degree of  fluctuation is comparable with 
that of  total  output. The shape of  the curve for employment looks very 
much like the one derived in figure 5.1 from the estimated relation.  In 
this example we have not  assumed any cost of  adjustment of  changing 
employment  from  one period  to another, as is emphasized  in  some of 
Sargent’s work.  Such an  assumption  can easily be incorporated  in our 
framework  as  well  and  would  have  made  the  curve for  employment 
(and output) even more similar to the estimated one. 
This example illustrates the  effects of  permanent  real shocks to the 
economy without  any  monetary  shocks or imperfect  information.  The 
results were not  sensitive at all to the choice  of  parameters of  prefer- 
ences. The most important feature of  our model in producing this kind 
of  persistence and momentum is the distributed lag. As we have argued 
earlier, there is strong a priori information on this lag, and this evidence 
7. The values of  the parameters can be obtained from the authors. For technical 
details see Kydland and Prescott  19786. 
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has been incorporated in our model.  In conclusion, this example shows 
substantial persistence and momentum  as a result of  a permanent inno- 
vation to technology. 
We next determined the equilibrium process when there were mone- 
tary  shocks (cA  $; 0) but  no  real  shocks  (26  =  0). The results  ob- 
tained correspond to those of  Lucas (1975) in his equilibrium model of 
the business cycle with  capital accumulation. There was no momentum, 
and the effect of  the shock was offset in subsequent periods.  A  similar 
result was obtained when there were transitory real shocks only  (21  =  0 
and  p =  0). The only important difference was that with positive real 
shocks agents rationally supplied  more labor services and accumulated 
more capital in and for a period subsequent to the period of  the shock, 
whereas with positive monetary shocks agents were tricked into supply- 
ing  more  labor  services  and  initiating  more  investment  projects  than 
were optimal. 
When  there  are  simultaneously  both  transitory  real  and  monetary 
shocks, however,  greater  persistence  and some momentum result.  This 
point is illustrated in figure 5.3, which depicts the response to an innova- 
tion in the productivity  process.  The effect on employment is larger in 
the third period than in the first. There is then a negative effect reflecting 
partly  a reduction in purchases of  durables  (since the steady state has 
not  changed)  and partly  the  increased value  of  leisure  resulting  from 
the  increased labor  supplied  in  the  previous  period.  This  response is 
consistent with the argument that monetary shocks can be used to delay 
a  recession  but  not  to avoid  it.  Offsetting real  shocks with  monetary 
shocks results in a more severe recession at a later time. 
I  effect 
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Policy Implications 
Most would  agree that some fluctuations  in output and employment 
are not a social problem and may even be socially desirable. For exam- 
ple, seasonal fluctuations, which are of  the same order of  magnitude as 
postwar  business cycle fluctuations,  generally  are not  considered  to be 
a matter of  great social concern. Indeed, the most widely reported  and 
watched time  series are all seasonally  adjusted. Most would  also agree 
that the 6%  average difference in seasonally unadjusted output between 
the fourth and first quarters could be eliminated by providing a modest 
wage subsidy in the first quarter and wage tax in the fourth to induce an 
intertemporal substitution of  labor supplied, but that this should not be 
done. 
What differentiates  fluctuations  resulting  from seasonal factors from 
those arising as the result of  shocks to the technology of  production and 
exchange? The answer sometimes given is that the seasonal components 
are predictable, whereas  shocks, by definition, are not. The implication 
of  competitive  theory  under uncertainty,  and therefore  the implication 
of  our theory, is that this argument is flawed. It is true that with antici- 
pated  events  adjustment  can  occur prior  as well  as  subsequent to the 
event although for a shock there can be no prior adjustment. This does 
not  invalidate the first theorem  of  welfare  economics, that, in the ab- 
sence  of  externalities,  competitive  equilibria,  including  those  of  the 
dynamic  stochastic  variety,  are Pareto optimal.* Consequently,  in the 
absence of  a public sector, the policy implication of  our theory of  fluctu- 
ations is that the cost of stabilizing the economy exceeds the benefits in 
the cost-benefit sense advocated by Phelps  (1972). It also follows that 
the monetary authorities should behave as predictably as possible. This 
would not eliminate monetary shocks but would reduce them and result 
in the improved performance of  the economy. 
Once a public sector is introduced into a competitive model, one can 
no longer rely upon the first theorem of welfare economics to answer the 
desirability  of  stabilization  policy  question.  Rather  one  must  apply 
modern public  finance  and  the theory  of  efficient ta~ation.~  Assuming 
that  sufficiently precise  estimates  of  the parameters  are available,  our 
theory predicts that greater stability could be achieved by an appropriate 
cyclical manipulation of tax rates  than if  a noncyclical  tax rate policy 
8. A few other weak conditions are needed for this result. For example, if  there 
is nonsatiation,  convex  preferences,  and the  individuals’ consumption  possibility 
sets are convex, the result follows  (Debreu 1954, theorem  1). 
9. We found Sandmo’s 1976 survey a good introduction to the optimal taxation 
literature. Diamond and McFadden  1974, Diamond  and Mirrlees  1971, and Har- 
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were pursued. To achieve the greater stability, the tax rates must be ad- 
justed  in response to shocks so that more labor is supplied in states in 
which employment would otherwise be below average and less in states 
in  which  it  would  be  above.  For  example, temporary  investment  tax 
credits reduce the cost of  future consumption in terms of  current leisure 
inducing  an increase  in  current labor  supplied.  Similarly  a  temporary 
wage tax affects the relative costs of  current and future leisure resulting 
in intertemporal substitutions. 
The  issue  then  is  whether  the  gains  from  manipulating  tax  rates 
cyclically to achieve greater stability exceed the costs. The answer to this 
question  is  no  and  follows  from  the  well-known  principle  of  public 
finance  (Ramsey  1927), that the  loss in  consumer surplus per  dollar 
collected from taxing a commodity  is  greater the more elastic is its de- 
mand.  Capital  goods  produced  in  different  periods  that  are  close  in 
time are close substitutes as are both market-produced and non-market- 
produced  goods  in  adjacent  periods.  The  elasticity  of  demand  for  a 
product with close substitutes is high. Thus varying tax rates over time 
to induce a particular state-contingent intertemporal reallocation of  labor 
supplied is inconsistent with efficient taxation, at least to a first approxi- 
mation. Cyclical variations in tax rates add to the burden  of  financing 
society’s demands for public goods and income redistributions. 
Summary 
The principle for fiscal policy that emerges from this exercise in neo- 
classical public finance is that tax rates should not respond, at least not 
much, to aggregate economic fluctuations. These are just the principles 
laid down by Friedman  (1948) thirty years ago. His conclusions, how- 
ever, were based in large part upon ignorance of  the timing and magni- 
tude  of  the  effects  of  various policy  actions.  With  our  analysis, these 
conclusions follow even if  the  structure of  the economy is  well under- 
stood and the consequences of  alternative stabilization  policy rules are 
econometrically  predictable.  We  did  not  determine  the  rule  with  the 
best  operating  characteristics  for  a  particular  estimated  structure,  as 
Taylor  (19794 did. This was unnecessary because the conclusion fol- 
lows from well-known principles  of  modern public finance. 
The issue was addressed within a competitive equilibrium framework 
which  requires maximizing behavior  and market  clearing. Part of  the 
maximizing assumption is the efficient use of  information or, equivalently, 
rational  expectations. Equilibrium  also requires that the set of  markets 
assumed be  sufficiently rich that it is  not in the mutual interest of  eco- 
nomic  agents to organize  additional markets.  We argued that the per- 
sistence of  deviations of  output from trend can be explained within the 
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goods.  Considerable persistence  of  the effects of  monetary,  fiscal, and 
technological  shocks  and  momentum  characterize  the  equilibrium be- 
havior  of  our  models,  which  incorporate  this  factor  as  part  of  the 
technology. 
The implication of  this equilibrium analysis is that the economy, like 
a  single-commodity market, can  be  stabilized  but  like the  commodity 
market, the costs of  stabilization exceed the benefits. Cyclical variations 
in tax rates, whether they increase or decrease fluctuations, increase the 
burden of  taxation. 
Comment  Martin Feldstein 
There are many things that I like about the Kydland and Prescott paper, 
particularly  the authors’ attempt to link modern public finance analysis 
with current macroeconomic theory. But I remain unconvinced by  their 
discussion of  the equilibrium business cycle and I do not think that they 
have  presented  a  new  case for restricting fluctuations  in  tax rates  for 
either stabilization or revenue reasons. 
Let me begin  with the part I like best:  the authors’ use of  a more 
general description of  the role of  fiscal effects than is typical in macro- 
economic  analyses. Instead  of  limiting their analysis of  fiscal policy to 
variations  in  lump  sum  taxes  or government  spending,  Kydland  and 
Prescott recognize the importance of  tax rules that change relative prices. 
In particular, I agree very strongly with their emphasis that the effect of 
inflation on real depreciation has been one of  the most significant fiscal 
effects on the economy in the 1970s. Larry Summers and I recently esti- 
mated that the use of  “original cost depreciation” for tax purposes with- 
out any adjustment for inflation caused taxable profits of  U.S. corpora- 
tions  in  1977 to be overstated by  $40 billion  or 39%  (Feldstein  and 
Summers, 1978b). Because of  the rise in the inflation rate during the 
past  decade, the  effective tax rate on real  corporate profits  rose from 
54% in  1967 to 66%  in  1977 despite a series of  statutory changes de- 
signed to reduce  the  tax  rate. Although  I have  analyzed  some of  the 
long-run implications of  the depreciation effect in papers with Summers 
(Feldstein and Summers 1978a) and with Green and Sheshinski (1978), 
the Kydland and Prescott paper is the first that I know that emphasizes 
the way  in  which  changes  in  the rate  of  inflation  can cause  cyclical 
instability. 
I have only one small quarrel with their analysis of  this issue. There 
is no doubt that the introduction of  the investment tax credit in the 1960s 
and the effect of  inflation on real depreciation in the 1970s would have 
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remained unchanged, that is, if these changes in the effective tax rate on 
capital income were fully shifted. But this conditional statement is very 
different from asserting that these tax changes would  actually increase 
the capital stock. If  the supply of  private saving is inelastic, the induced 
increases  in  the demand  for industrial capital  can  be  satisfied only at 
the expense of  residential construction and government demand. The net 
effect of  this substitution on employment is surely not unambiguous. 
But this is a question about their analysis and not about the historical 
facts. Let us accept, as historically  accurate, the following sequence of 
events  described  by  the  authors:  (1  ) Accelerated  depreciation  in the 
1960s and then  the  adverse effects of  the original cost depreciation in 
the inflationary  1970s caused changes in the desired capital stock.  (2) 
These changes in desired capital caused the actual capital stock to adjust 
with  a distributed lag of  investment.  (3) This pattern of  capital stock 
adjustment caused fluctuations in output and employment. 
The key question is: How should the change in employment be inter- 
preted? There are three quite different possibilities and each has different 
implications  about the rest of  the analysis. 
Kydland and Prescott regard any change in employment as an equilib- 
rium intertemporal substitution of  leisure in the manner  of  the original 
Lucas and Rapping paper. An alternative interpretation is the Friedman- 
Phelps view, namely,  that  increases  in  nominal  wages fooled  workers 
into  accepting jobs with  a lower  real  wage than they otherwise would 
have accepted. Finally, there is the traditional Keynesian view that in the 
early  1960s there  was  a  temporary  disequilibrium-that  is,  short-run 
involuntary unemployment-and  that the increase in aggregate demand 
permitted the unemployed to find jobs; according to this Keynesian view, 
the reverse  process  of  creating disequilibrium  unemployment  occurred 
in the mid-1970s. 
Although Kydland  and Prescott present a consistent model interpret- 
ing the facts in the first framework, they provide no evidence or logic to 
make this first interpretation more plausible than either of  the other two 
or than  some  combination  of  all  three.  While  I  believe  in the  inter- 
temporal substitution of  leisure in some circumstances  (e.g., that social 
security  induces earlier  retirement  and might  cause more work  during 
preretirement  years),  I  doubt the relevance of  intertemporal  substitu- 
tion to unemployment fluctuations. I certainly do not think it is the sole 
explanation. I remain to be convinced that there is any persuasive evi- 
dence,  let  alone the “ample evidence” to which Kydland  and Prescott 
refer. 
The authors’ characterization of  unemployment is important in another 
context. In the paper they raise a general methodological issue by assert- 
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of stabilization policy. That position  is correct only if  all cyclical insta- 
bility  in  employment  represents  equilibrium  intertemporal  substitution 
of  leisure. More generally, if  there is  a temporary disequilibrium (i.e., 
short-run  involuntary  unemployment)  or  if  workers  are  temporarily 
“fooled” by changes in nominal magnitudes, the conditions required for 
the application of traditional welfare analysis are not satisfied. With dis- 
equilibrium unemployment, the observed prices are not market-clearing 
ones and certainly do not measure the marginal evaluations of  the private 
agents. If  workers are being “fooled,” the observed prices may clear the 
market,  but the workers’ actual marginal rates of  substitution between 
goods and leisure equal what they (falsely) believe to be the real wage 
rates rather than the observed real wage rates. 
In practice,  the  authors do not  try  to  apply the traditional  welfare 
argument to stabilization  policy. Instead, they use it to analyze the ap- 
propriate mix of  fluctuations in  debt and in taxes in response to exog- 
enously  determined  changes  in  government spending.  The use  of  tra- 
ditional welfare economics in this context is quite appropriate since un- 
employment as such is irrelevant. But I find their argument for fluctua- 
tions in borrowing rather than in tax rates far from compelling. It rests 
on the assertion that current labor supply is  very sensitive to small dif- 
ferences  between  the  current  real  wage rate and the future  real wage 
rate.  It  requires  that  individuals  can  distinguish  permanent  tax  rate 
changes from temporary ones and can adjust their labor supply accord- 
ingly. Moreover, the analysis in the paper appears to assume a fixed capi- 
tal  stock  so  that  variation  in  debt  only  affects consumptions  and  not 
changes in capital or production. Let me emphasize that I do not disagree 
with the authors’ conclusion  about the appropriate fluctuations  in debt 
and taxes. But  I think  a more complete analysis is  required  to make a 
convincing case. 
Let me return now to the authors’ key  conclusion that “tax and in- 
vestment  credit rates  should not  be varied  in  an effort to stabilize the 
economy.”  This  conclusion  follows  directly  from  their  view  that  all 
employment fluctuations represent equilibrium intertemporal substitution 
of  leisure. If  there are costs of  adjustment, asymmetries of  information, or 
other  reasons  why  observed  fluctuations  in  unemployment  represent 
temporary  disequilibrium,  there  is  a potential role for good macroeco- 
nomic  policy.  The choice among fiscal  and  monetary  instruments de- 
pends on issues of  timing and of  the mix of  demands to be affected. The 
government’s limited ability to forecast the future course of  the economy 
and the effects of  different stabilization  policies is to me still the main 
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Comment  Robert E. Hall 
Given  its  very  strong  premises,  the  paper  by  Kydland  and  Prescott 
reaches  a  sharp  conclusion-minimization  of  the  deadweight  loss  of 
fiscal programs requires equalization of  tax rates over the present and the 
future. When new information arrives, tax rates should move in tandem. 
Temporary fiscal  moves  are  never  planned,  though  they  may  happen 
unexpectedly. The paper is the application of  a very general proposition 
about optimal planning when the present and future instruments enter 
the objective function symmetrically. Other applications can be made to 
consumption, where the rational consumer never plans a temporary ad- 
justment of  consumption, and to the dividend policy of  the firm. 
The provocative issue raised by this paper is the relevance of  the gen- 
eral  principle-that  is,  whether  it  is  true that the deadweight  loss  of 
present  and  future  fiscal  moves  are  symmetrical  on the  margin.  The 
case made for thc application of  the principle in  the paper rests on the 
equilibrium interpretation of aggregate fluctuations-cyclical  changes in 
employment  represent  movements  along  an  aggregate  supply  function 
for labor. The premise of  the paper is that the cyclical labor supply sched- 
ule  reflects the true  valuation  of  workers’ time.  That valuation  is  not 
very sensitive to the amount of work done, on the margin, because peo- 
pe havc valuable alternative activities. A recession is just a spell when 
the financial reward for work is low and other activities become attrac- 
tive. This contrasts  strikingly with  the Keynesian  view  that there  is  a 
strong externality operating in a recession: the marginal value of labor’s 
time drops far below the marginal product of  labor, and genuine invol- 
untary unemployment results. Under the Keynesian view, the premise of 
the paper is quite wrong and something like a temporary investment sub- 
sidy to offset a recession makes good economic sense. 
In  its  most  carefully  stated  form,  for  example,  in  this  paper,  the 
equilibrium  theory  of  business  cycles interprets the observed  combina- 
tion  of  interest  rates,  current and expected future wages, and level of 
employment as a point  on an intertemporal labor supply function. Em- 
ployment will be low  when the current reward  to labor is low relative 
to its discounted future value. Kydland and Prescott continue the tradi- 
tion of  emphasizing fluctuations of  the real wage as the most important 
ingredient in this calculation, though it has been pointed out by several 
authors that movements in interest rates could be the principal source of 
changes in the optimal intertemporal labor supply plan of  the worker. 
Testing of  the equilibrium-labor  supply hypothesis has been no better 
than rudimentary.  Its proponents have cited some fragmentary evidence 
on the intertemporal substitutability of  alternative uses of  time. Its many 
critics have  generally  asserted  that the  hypothesis  is too foolish  to be 
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ence) or that it was refuted by simple evidence. It has often been said 
that the equilibrium theory predicts that quits should rise in a recession, 
so the theory must be wrong because quits actually fall. 
My own view is that the equilibrium theory deserves a serious exami- 
nation  and that it is not self-evident that it is completely wrong or com- 
pletely  right. With respect to the long-standing  and basic criticism that 
the  theory  makes  all cyclical movements  in  labor  supply  “voluntary,” 
one of  the branches of  modern theory of  labor contracts suggest a possi- 
ble answer-under  labor contracts, workers cede to employers the right 
to determine the level of  employment  subject to prescribed rules about 
compensation. If  the rules respect the value of  the worker’s time, then 
it  could  both be true that  employers make unilateral  employment de- 
cisions and that the observed movements are along the true labor supply 
function. 
This line of  argument only weakens one of  the elements of  the case 
against  the equilibrium theory.  The real  task  of  the proponents  of  the 
theory is to show that the intertemporal substitutability is high enough to 
explain observed cycles. The evidence on this point is  mixed. What we 
seem to have learned from the various negative income tax experiments, 
for example, is fairly weak substitution toward nonwork activities under 
temporary reductions of  wages in the order of  50%. But contract theory 
may  help  explain  the  weakness  of  that  response,  since contracts have 
not been  written  to take account of  the appropriate adjustment of  em- 
ployment in response  to an experimental temporary  tax. All I can say 
at this stage is that much more thought and work is needed. 
Comment  John B. Taylor* 
In their paper Kydland and Prescott present a novel technique for answer- 
ing an old macroeconomic question: Can fiscal policy be used to stabilize 
the  economy?  The  technique  combines  “equilibrium  business  cycle 
modelling”  with  modern  tools  of  public  finance and  contrasts sharply 
with  the conventional  techniques-such  as econometric model simula- 
tion-now  commonly used to answer such questions. Although the tech- 
nique confronts some difficult modelling and computational problems, it 
offers a promising alternative to the more traditional methods of  quanti- 
tative policy evaluation. 
The first stage of  the Kydland-Prescott policy evaluation method is the 
development  of  an equilibrium business cycle model which displays the 
major empirical regularities of  macroeconomic fluctuations. For example, 
*A grant from the National  Science Foundation is  gratefully acknowledged. 192  Finn Kydland and Edward C. Prescott 
they model contemporaneous correlations between the major aggregates 
by  assuming limited  information about aggregate disturbances in  local 
markets. More difficult however, is modelling serial  correlations which 
characterize business cycles. Kydland and Prescott summarize these in- 
temporal  correlations  in  terms of  an estimated second-order stochastic 
difference equation in the linearly detrended log of  real GNP (yt)  : 
(1)  yt =  1.4yt-1 -  .5yt-,  +  Et. 
This can  be written  equivalently  as  a  distributed lag in the shock  Et. 
That is, 
where  q0  =  1 and the  $$  weights first increase before starting to decline 
toward the neighborhood  of  zero.1° The primary  explanation  given by 
Kydland and Prescott  for this  “humped” pattern  is the  delay between 
actual expenditures and planned  expenditures for many components of 
GNP. For example, investment expenditures are a distributed lag of  in- 
vestment  plans,  and  empirically  this  lag  is  “humped”;  hence  output 
should  also  have  a  humped  lag  distribution  similar  to  the  observed 
I,!J~  values in equation (2). 
Although  this  type  of  investment  behavior  will  indeed  produce  the 
desired correlation pattern, I feel it has two basic difficulties as a central 
mechanism  for  generating  output  persistence  in  this  model.  First,  in 
order  for  such  a  mechanism  to  qualify  as an essential  propagator  of 
business  cycle fluctuations,  the  impulse  variables  (in  this  case invest- 
ment  plans)  should  be  serially uncorrelated.  If  the impulse  variables 
themselves are serially correlated, then another propagation mechanism 
is necessary to explain this persistence.  In fact, investment plans do ap- 
pear to be highly correlated serially. For example, capital appropriations 
and construction permits, which are rough proxies of  expenditure plans, 
have  high  serial  correlation  properties.  Moreover,  this  correlation  is 
very similar to that of  investment expenditures.ll Since the expenditure- 
planning lag hypothesis does not explain these fluctuations, it is insuffi- 
cient as a mechanism to generate business cycle movements without other 
sources of  persistence. 
A  second  difficulty is  related to the  “parameter  variation”  problem 
emphasized by Robert Lucas. As stated by Kydland and Prescott, avoid- 
10.  Many such empirical regularities are presented in Hodrick and Prescott  1978, 
where alternative detrending methods are also examined. 
11.  Many variables which are representative  of  expenditure plans,  such as per- 
mit authorizations, are thought to be leading indicators of  actual expenditures. As 
leading  indicators, they  tend  to have  serial correlation properties  which  are sim- 
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ing policy-induced  shifts in parameters  is  a  major  motivation  for de- 
veloping models  like  the  one  they  propose  here  as  an  alternative  to 
conventional  econometric  models.  Yet,  the  expenditure-planning  lag 
emphasized  by  Kydland  and  Prescott is not  derived  explicitly from  a 
maximizing model  and, hence,  in  principle  is  subject  to such  policy- 
induced shifts. Moreover, one might expect such shifts in the expendi- 
ture-planning  lag mechanism to be important in practice. For example, 
construction  of  previously  planned  projects  might  be  accelerated  in 
anticipation of  higher costs-perhaps  induced by a policy change. If  the 
effect of  policy on this acceleration is not accounted for, then a wrong- 
and  possibly  destabilizing-policy  might  be  used.  While  all  existing 
econometric  models  are  subject to this  same problem,  I emphasize it 
here because  one of  the main reasons for using these techniques  is to 
avoid such problems. 
A  number of  other  explanations  of  the pattern of  serial  correlation 
summarized in  (2)  have been  proposed  by business cycle researchers. 
The flexible  accelerator  mechanism  will  generate such  correlation for 
suitable parameter values, and attempts have been made to develop this 
mechanism in a simple rational expectations model (see Pashigian 1969). 
Another explanation comes from some of  my own research on staggered 
contracts  with  rational  expectations  (see  Taylor  19794. Serial  per- 
sistence patterns  similar  to  (2) may  be  due to  short-lived  wage  and 
price  rigidities which cause purely random shocks to accumulate for a 
number  of  periods before their effect diminishes toward zero. A review 
of  U.S. data suggests that contracts about one year in duration may be 
sufficient to generate business cycle persistence similar to what has been 
observed during the postwar  period.  One advantage  of  this alternative 
type of  rational expectations model is that it also generates a persistence 
of  inflation. In fact a good argument can be made that the persistence 
of  inflation is at least as big a theoretical challenge to rational expecta- 
tions theorists as the persistence of  output or employment fluctuations: 
if  policymakers form expectations rationally  and the world behaves ac- 
cording to the market-clearing rational expectations model described by 
Kydland  and  Prescott,  then  there  is  no explanation  for the intlation- 
supporting aggregate demand  policies which we  have  observed  during 
much of  the postwar  period.  The inflation-output trade-offs evident  in 
contract models provide at least a partial explanation. 
With the exceptions  noted  above, Kydland  and Prescott build  their 
equilibrium business cycle model upon  the  assumption  of  utility maxi- 
mization. That is, they posit a representative household utility function 
which depends on  consumption,  leisure, and government expenditures, 
and they assume that households maximize this utility function  subject 
to budget constraints. An important and welcome feature of  their policy 
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tion policy. No additional policy criterion function-such  as a quadratic 
loss  in  output  and  inflation  fluctuations-is  needed  for  the  analysis. 
Since the maximized value of  the household utility functions depends on 
the parameters of  government decision rules, the welfare effects of  policy 
can be evaluated directly by  examining the improvement or deteriora- 
tion of  individual utilities as policy changes. 
In principle, such an approach is preferable to the more standard pro- 
cedure of  postulating a simple aggregate policy criterion which is only 
indirectly  related  to individual  welfare.  But  the indirect approach has 
practical advantages. There are many reasons why macroeconomic policy 
should aim to reduce the size of  output and price fluctuations-simply 
maintaining a stable and  relatively certain  environment for private de- 
cision  making  is  one  reason.  Such  reasons  have  not,  however,  been 
formally linked to a basic household utility function analysis. Apparently 
a fairly complex  and complete  model  must  be developed  to formalize 
such  a  link.  Until  this development, a  simple  aggregate criterion may 
serve well as a first approximation.12 
Using this model  and this procedure  for evaluating policy,  Kydland 
and Prescott conclude their analysis by examining whether taxes or bor- 
rowing should  be used  to finance temporary  government expenditures. 
They find the model indicates that it is better to finance temporary ex- 
penditures (such as wars) by bond finance, leaving more lasting expendi- 
tures to tax finance. Intuitively, this result is due to the assumption that 
labor supply  and the demand for durables are very elastic in the short 
run, but not  in  the long run. If  so, then  the Ramsey inverse  elasticity 
rule-lower  taxes  on high  elasticity items-suggests  the resulting  debt 
finance  mix.  It  is  reassuring  that  the formal  techniques  give  answers 
which correspond to this intuitive finding. 
This result,  which is the main conclusion of  the policy analysis, cer- 
tainly has important implications for fiscal stabilization policy. For ex- 
ample, it gives a rationale for stability of  tax rates and hence for includ- 
ing  the  major  tax  instruments  of  fiscal  policy  in  aggregate  criterion 
functions-policy  variables are usually included for pure computational 
reasons and to prevent  the  embarrassment  of  instrument  instability. It 
is  not  clear,  however,  why  this  result  is  particularly  relevant  to  the 
central question of  the  paper. An analysis of  other fiscal policy issues, 
such as the usefulness of  the automatic stabilizers, might have been more 
helpful. Nevertheless,  developing  and applying an equilibrium business 
cycle model to a central problem of  public finance represents an impor- 
tant and unique  contribution  to the problem  of  policy  evaluation in  a 
rational expectations setting. 
12. An  example  of  the  potential  empirical  advantages  of  such  a  criterion  is 
given  in a rational expectations setting by Taylor  (1979). 195  A Competitive Theory of Fluctuations 
General Discussion 
In response to the comment by Taylor that the lag weights in his equa- 
tion  (2) would themselves change with policy rules, Prescott suggested 
that the weights were dependent on technology and would thus be policy 
invariant. He also remarked that procyclical movement of  the real wage 
was needed  for  persistence  effects, even though  real wage movements 
need not be large. 
On the persistence  issue raised by Taylor, Robert Barro commented 
that it was difficult to reconcile the behavior  of  prices with that of  real 
output and unemployment. Disequilibrium or contracting models imply a 
pattern of  price persistence that matches the pattern of  output and unem- 
ployment persistence. 
Edmund  Phelps  suggested  that  the  terms  “equilibrium”  and  “dis- 
equilibrium” were being used in confusing ways. Markets might well clear 
even  with  disequilibrium;  he  defined  equilibrium  as  an  evolution  of 
events in which expectations were borne out-and  this did not require or 
imply that demand equaled supply in every market. 
Robert Hall preferred a definition of  equilibrium as a situation where 
people think they have no further opportunity to make themselves better 
off, and where the basic efficiency conditions are met. 
Phelps also voiced concern  about the time inconsistency  of  optimal 
policy.  Time  inconsistency implies  that  if  generation  “zero”  conducts 
policy based on a utilitarian or other social welfare function, then subse- 
quent generations would find it desirable to deviate from the policy that 
had previously been optimal. He did not see why the use of  rules would 
solve this problem-since  the later generations would still be better off 
if  they broke the rules. 
Charles Nelson noted that stability required the sum of the coefficients 
in  the  Kydland-Prescott  autoregressive  equation  for  output to be less 
than unity. If  the stochastic process for output were unstable, parameter 
estimates might still tend to indicate stationarity even though it did not 
obtain;  he  was  thus  worried  about  how  close  the  Kydland-Prescott 
equation  was to instability.  William Poole did not  see  any persuasive 
reason for technological  change and relative price  shifts to occur over 
time in such a way that per capita income should return to trend. 
Alan Blinder commented on Hall’s remarks  on testing the degree of 
intertemporal  substitution of  leisure that it might be useful to examine 
the evidence from temporary tax cuts, such as that of  1968. Robert Solow 
pointed  out  that  the  intertemporal  substitution  of  leisure  mechanism 
implied that the demand for leisure complements, such as ski equipment, 
color TV sets, should be countercyclical. This could easily be tested. 
Robert Weintraub picked up on the argument that high real interest 
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and suggested that people should answer unemployment surveys by say- 
ing “I’m waiting for real interest rates to rise.” He was similarly bemused 
by the fact that Barro’s paper explained the behavior of  prices using the 
nominal interest rate: now he could agree with those who blamed infla- 
tion on high interest rates. 
Frank Morris commented that the policy prescription of  Kydland and 
Prescott had been followed by  Lyndon Johnson, who refused to change 
tax  rates  during the  Vietnam intervention:  it  was  good  to know  that 
policy had then been optimal. 
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